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PROPERTY 
W. Wade Berryhill* 
This year, the courts decided many property law issues of inter-
est to the general practitioner. Section I discusses cases from the 
federal district and circuit courts, as well as the Virginia Supreme 
Court and the Virginia Court of Appeals. 
The 1987 session of the General Assembly resulted in several 
changes affecting property laws in Virginia. Section II lists the 
most significant statutes. 
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Condominiums, Breach of Warranty and Statute of 
Limitations 
In Harbour Gate Owners' Association v. Berg,1 the Virginia Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court's determination that the 
plaintiffs' (unit owners) cause of action against the condominium 
developer was barred by the statute of limitations. The court ap-
plied the two-year warranty on common elements in a condomin-
ium imposed by section 55-79.79(b) of the Code of Virginia (the 
"Code").2 Furthermore, the court applied the three-year statute of 
limitations period for implied contracts.3 
Central to the case was the court's determination that owners 
who purchased condominiums before the October 1, 1977 effective 
date of Code section 8.01-2304 were not barred from bringing suit. 
Section 8.01-230 provides that the statute of limitations for dam-
age to property shall begin to run from the date when the breach 
occurs, not when the resulting damage is discovered. 5 This author 
must echo Justice Russell's comment: 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1967, 
Arkansas State University; J.D., 1972, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1976, Columbia 
University. 
1. 232 Va. 98, 348 S.E.2d 252 (1986). 
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.79 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
3. Id. § 8.01-246(4) (Repl. Vol. 1984). 
4. Id. § 8.01-230. 
5. Id. 
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Code§ 8.01-230 was enacted in 1977 as a part of a thorough revision 
of laws pertaining to civil procedure. It seems unlikely that the re-
visors intended the harsh result dictated by its clear language: in a 
property damage case where the breach of duty precedes the result-
ing injury or damage, the property owner's right to sue may be 
barred before his property suffers any injury or damage. Indeed, as 
here, al)y right of action may be barred before he becomes an owner 
of the property. It is not our function to amend the law, however, 
and we must leave to the General Assembly any consideration of 
change.6 
The result of the decision was that those who purchased condo-
miniums after the effective date of the revision to section 8.01-230 
were barred from bringing their suits. The 1987 legislature an-
swered Justice Russell's challenge in part, by amending the condo-
minium act to provide for a five-year statute of limitations for 
breach of warranty. 7 
B. Contracts 
In Duggin v. Williams,8 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that 
loss of an assignment fee on breach of the assigned contract was 
not within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was 
made. Therefore, it is not a proper measure of damages for breach. 
The action in Presidential Gardens/Duke Street Limited Part-
nership v. Salisbury Slye, Ltd. 9 was based upon the refusal of the 
purchaser to settle a real estate contract. The purchaser claimed 
title was unmarketable because a recorded deed of vacation existed 
for certain streets and lots in the subdivision which were included 
in the description of the subject property to be conveyed. The ven-
dor, upon the purchaser's refusal to settle, sold the property to an-
other and sought to retain the earnest money deposit. The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court's hold-
ing that the deed of vacation was a nullity because it failed to com-
ply with the statutory requirements of the Code of Virginia. There-
fore, title was marketable and the purchaser had no valid basis for 
refusing to close. The vendor retained the deposit.10 
6. Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n, 232 Va. at 107 n.3, 348 S.E.2d at 258 n.3. 
7. VA. CooE ANN. § 55-79.79(c) (Supp. 1987). 
8. 233 Va. 25, 353 S.E.2d 721 (1987). 
9. 802 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986). 
10. Id. at 109-11. 
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In Taylor v. Sanders, 11 the court considered whether a promis-
sory note given upon execution of a sales contract was enforceable 
as liquidated damages or was unenforceable as a penalty. The par-
ties executed two documents. The first document was a sales con-
tract providing that the note would constitute full damages if the 
parties failed to settle. The second document was an occupancy 
agreement granting the purchasers immediate possession of the 
property. The occupancy agreement also provided that actual dam-
ages to the property would be deducted from the note placed in 
escrow. 
The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the note served a 
dual purpose. First, the note represented an earnest money deposit 
to become damages on breach of the sales contract. Second, the 
note constituted a security deposit under the occupancy agree-
ment. Upon finding that the suit before the court was based upon 
the sales contract, and viewing the sum of the note as not dispro-
portionate to probable loss, and therefore not a penalty, the court 
ruled for the vendor .12 
C. Deeds 
The sole issue addressed in Goodson v. Capehart13 was the 
proper construction of a deed. The preamble expressed an intent 
to convey a life estate and the granting clause expressed an intent 
to convey a fee simple absolute. Although this was the first time 
the court had been asked to consider a conflict between a granting 
clause and a preamble, numerous conflicts have been resolved in 
the past between granting clauses and habendum clauses.14 In fol-
lowing this line of precedent, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled 
that the granting clause prevails when the intent of the parties can 
not be ascertained within the four corners of the deed. The court 
also found support in Code section 55-11 providing that "the grant 
shall be construed to convey the fee simple, . . . unless a contrary 
intention appears in the deed."111 
In Cumbee v. Myers, 16 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a 
11. 233 Va. 73, 353 S.E.2d 745 (1987). 
12. Id. at 76, 353 S.E.2d at 747. 
13. 232 Va. 232, 349 S.E.2d 130 (1986). 
14. See 2 R MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1032, at 1336 (2d ed. 1928). 
15. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-11 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
16. 232 Va. 371, 350 S.E.2d 633 (1986). 
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notary public's certification that a deed was "subscribed and sworn 
to" by the grantor satisfies the acknowledgment requirement of 
Code section 55-113.17 
In Johnson v. Buzzard Island Shooting Club,18 the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar a suit 
challenging a void deed. Justice Cochran wrote that if the plaintiffs 
owned the property at the time the Commonwealth conveyed the 
property to the defendants, the deed was void ab initio. The plain-
tiffs were entitled to notice when the defendant sought to acquire 
title of alleged "waste and unappropriated" lands. Notice was not 
given. Neither Code sections 8.01-113 nor 8.01-238 can therefore be 
used to divest one who was not a party to the suit of ownership 
brought by one holding a void deed.19 
D. Rescinding Deeds for Inadequate Consideration 
In a decision that should be included in every law school prop-
erty casebook, as well as delight its first-year student readers, the 
supreme court in Payne v. Simmons20 ordered rescission of a deed 
where the defendants took advantage of their recluse cousin of di-
minished legal capacity. The defendant grantees befriended the 
plaintiff, persuading him to convey his property for a fraction of 
market value. In return, the grantees agreed to reserve a life estate 
for the plaintiff. However, the defendants omitted the life estate. 
When an altercation arose between the parties, the defendants had 
the plaintiff evicted. The defendants then proceeded to improve 
the property.21 
Justice Russell delivered the opinion of the court, declaring that 
the chancellor's conclusions of law are not given the same conclu-
sive effect as his findings of fact. The chancellor found that the 
plaintiff had a diminished mental capacity and that he received 
grossly inadequate consideration for the property. Under these 
facts, the chancellor should have concluded as a matter of law that 
the transaction constituted both constructive and actual fraud. 
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-113. 
18. 232 Va. 32, 348 S.E.2d 220 (1986). 
19. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-113 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (imposing a twelve-month limitation 
period for actions to disturb title of a purchaser at judicial sale); id. § 8.01-238 (requiring 
that bills in equity to repeal grants made by the Commonwealth be brought within ten 
years). 
20. 232 Va. 379, 350 S.E.2d 637 (1986). 
21. Id. at 380-82, 350 S.E.2d at 638-39. 
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The supreme court further reasoned that when the fraud justifying 
recission of a contract is merely constructive, the parties are to be 
placed in status quo. But when actual fraud is shown as in this 
case, the defendants are entitled to neither reimbursement for the 
purchase price nor to compensation for improvements.22 
E. Deed of Trust Note 
In Lambert v. Barker,23 the defendap.t claimed that he had satis-
fied a deed of trust by making payment to the original noteholder. 
The original noteholder fraudulently testified that he lost the note 
but was still the noteholder. In fact, he assigned the note secured 
by the deed of trust to the plaintiff. The trial court ruled for the 
maker on the basis that the debt was satisfied for failure of the 
endorsee-plaintiff to give notice to the maker of the pledge of the 
note as required by Code section 8.9-318(3).24 The Virginia Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court, holding that section 
8.9-318(3) does not apply to notes secured by real property. Pay-
ment in satisfaction of an instrument must be made to the holder 
in possession and no notice is required. The maker, said the court, 
should have protected himself by refusing to make payment until 
the instrument was produced, or proof of ownership was made in a 
law suit.25 
F. Easements 
At issue in Burks Bros. of Virginia v. Jones26 was whether either 
the public or private adjacent landowners had acquired rights of 
access over an old mountain trail and a portion of an abandoned 
public road. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the general 
public had acquired, by implied dedication or prescription, a right 
to use the road. Part of the decree affirmed that adjacent landown-
ers acquired a right by prescription, reinforcing the long-standing 
rules of presumed adverse use and exclusiveness. 27 
22. Id. at 385·87, 350 S.E.2d at 641-42. 
23. 232 Va. 21, 348 S.E.2d 214 (1986). 
24. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 8.9-318(3) (Added Vol. 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1987). 
25. Lambert, 232 Va. at 24-25, 348 S.E.2d at 215-16; see VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.3-804 (remedy 
for ovmer of last note). 
26. 232 Va. 238, 349 S.E.2d 134 (1986). 
27. The use [is] exclusive when it is proprietary, not a use by the public generally, and is 
exercised under some claim which is independent of and does not depend for enjoy-
ment upon similar rights by others. It is not necessary, however, that the claimant be 
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In Brown v. Haley,28 the court was faced with two issues: (1) was 
the present suit, asking the court to establish an implied or quasi 
easement, barred by a prior suit which determined that the de-
fendant held title to subject lands; and (2) did the plaintiffs have 
an easement across subject lands. Both actions were based on the 
deed from the defendant to the grantee-plaintiff. The deed 
description provided for the grantee's boundary to be the 800 foot 
contour line, the estimated water level of Smith Mountain Lake. 
However, the water level of the lake when filled generally remains 
within the 790-foot to 795-foot contours. As a consequence, the 
plaintiffs' land was separated from the lake water by a narrow strip 
of land determined in the first lawsuit to be owned by the defend-
ants. The plaintiffs sought a declaration by the court that the 
plaintiffs had an easement across the defendant's land in order to 
reach the water. The court found that the first suit was not res 
judicata to the second proceeding because the first suit dealt with 
the issue of title to the land. The second suit dealt with the exis-
tence of an easement. 29 
On the second issue, the court found that the plaintiff's evidence 
established a quasi easement or an implied easement from prior 
use. The plaintiff met the burden of proof by presenting clear and 
convincing evidence that the use was a reasonable necessity.30 A 
key finding of fact was that the defendants knew that the plain-
tiffs' sole purpose in purchasing the tract was to provide water-
related recreation for themselves and their tenants. 
In a third suit to come before the Virginia Supreme Court this 
year dealing with implied and prescriptive easements, the court 
again outlined the requisite elements of prescriptive and implied 
easements, affirming long-standing hornbook law principles.31 
However, the court adopted the same burden of proof for ease-
the only one to enjoy the right of way, as other persons may acquire a prescriptive 
right to use it. When a way has been so used for a period of more than twenty years, 
the origin of the way not being shown, the bona fides of the claim of right is estab-
lished and a presumption of a right to the use arises from the long acquiescence of 
the owner of the servient estate, and the burden is on him to rebut that presumption 
by showing permission or license from him or those under whom he claims. 
Totten v. Stuart, 143 Va. 201, 203-04, 129 S.E. 217, 218 (1925). 
28. 233 Va. 210, 355 S.E.2d 563 (1987). 
29. Id. at 212-16, 355 S.E.2d at 565-67. The test used by the court "to determine whether 
claims are part of a single cause of action is whether the same evidence is necessary to prove 
each claim." Id. at 216, 355 S.E.2d at 567. 
30. Id. at 219-20, 335 S.E.2d at 569-70. 
31. Pettus v. Keeling, 232 Va. 483, 352 S.E.2d 321 (1987). 
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ments by prescription as it had previously adopted for easements 
by necessity. Both must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The dispute in Pettus, centered on whether the use was permis-
sive. Defendant landowners claimed that the roadway was used by 
the general public in a neighborly reciprocal manner with no evi-
dence of anyone using it under a hostile claim of right. The court 
rejected the defendants' argument and upheld the trial court's 
opinion that the plaintiffs used the roadway as the only access to 
their property and they did not lose their claim of right simply 
because the road was also used by the general public.32 
G. Escheat; Eminent Domain 
In United States v. 198.73 Acres of Land, More or Less,33 the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that there can be no partial or piecemeal es-
cheat, as the Commonwealth of Virginia claimed. The court also 
rejected the Commonwealth's claim that the heirs abandoned the 
property based on the Commonwealth's position that the heirs 
were entitled to only six percent of the condemnation proceeds. 
Because the Commonwealth is estopped to claim abandonment, 
the court concluded that the heirs were entitled to all the 
proceeds. 34 
H. Landlord/Tenant 
In Neale v. Jones,35 the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
rule that rescission will not be granted for breach of contract un-
less it is of such a substantial character as to defeat the object of 
the parties. 
In Appalachian Power Co. v. Sanders,36 the supreme court re-
versed in part the trial court which had allowed a jury instruction 
based upon section 359 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The 
Restatement provides that a lessor is liable for injuries to the 
lessee's invitees under the "public use" exception to the general 
32. Id. at 486, 352 S.E.2d at 324. 
33. 800 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1986). 
34. Id. at 436. 
35. 232 Va. 203, 349 S.E.2d 116 (1986). 
36. 232 Va. 189, 349 S.E.2d 101 (1986). 
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rule of non-liability of the landlord for the condition of the 
premises. 37 
In rejecting this exception, the court adhered to the old rule that 
a landlord is liable only for latent defects absent a covenant in the 
lease agreement for warranty or repair. Additionally, the lease con-
tained a provision for indemnity by the lessee for any loss suffered 
by the lessor. The court ruled that the provision was valid and the 
lessor was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and ex-
penses of litigation in def ending the suit. 38 
The court perhaps was impressed by the fact that the lessor 
leased two vacant lots to Patrick County-Stuart Chamber of Com-
merce for the consideration of one dollar in order for the Chamber 
to conduct a Harvest Festival. During the four-day term of the 
lease, one of the lessee's invitees stepped into a hole overgrown by 
vines. The invitee su:ff ered a broken ankle. The jury awarded 
$125,000 damages against both the lessor and the lessee, jointly 
and severally. The court affirmed the judgment of $125,000 against 
the defendant Chamber of Commerce but not the lessor.39 
The Fourth Circuit held that an alleged sublease was in fact an 
assignment in the case of Tidewater Investors v. United Dominion 
Realty Trust.40 Therefore, the subtenant had standing to sue the 
landlord for improper eviction. The court overturned the district 
court's finding that the subtenant had no privity of contract or es-
tate under a sublease, and therefore lacked standing to sue the 
landlord.41 
In Northfield Investment Co. v. United Way of America,42 the 
Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that a tenant was liable for rent 
payments only for the two weeks the tenant occupied the premises 
37. A lessor who leases land for a purpose which involves the admission of the public is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to persons who enter the land for that 
purpose by a condition of the land existing when the lessee takes possession, if the 
lessor 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover that the condition 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such persons, and 
(b) has reason to expect that the lessee will admit them before the land is put in 
safe condition for their reception, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to discover or to remedy the condition, or 
otherwise to protect such persons against it. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965). 
38. Appalachian Power Co., 232 Va. at 195-96, 349 S.E.2d at 105-06. 
39. Id. at 191, 196, 349 S.E.2d at 102-03, 106. 
40. 804 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1986). 
41. Id. at 295-96. 
42. 233 Va. 124, 353 S.E.2d 774 (1987). 
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after expiration of a term lease. The tenant occupied the premises 
pursuant to an oral agreement between the parties for an exten-
sion. The landlord claimed contract rent for a full month. The 
court, in rejecting the landlord's argument, declared that Code sec-
tion 55-223 is inapplicable when a holding over occurs pursuant to 
an express agreement with the landlord. 
In Pantry Pride Enterprises v. Stop & Shop Cos.,43 the landlord 
had a first right of refusal for the assignment of the remainder of a 
leasehold. The Fourth Circuit affirmed a grant of specific perform-
ance to the landlord, enabling him to exercise his right. The court, 
however, remanded the cause to the district court for a determina-
tion of the price at which the lessor could exercise the refusal right. 
The trial court had adopted the artificial price allocated by the 
tenant for the sale of both the leasehold and equipment to a third 
party.44 
The issue in Kesler v. Allen45 was whether a landlord, who em-
ploys an independent contractor to make repairs or improvements, 
is liable to the tenant for injuries resulting from the contractor's 
negligence.46 The Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
landlord, holding that the tenant had neither alleged that the land-
lord was negligent in selecting the contractor, nor established one 
of the exceptions to the general rule that a landlord "who employs 
an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to third persons 
caused by the contractor's negligence. "47 
I. Priority of Liens 
In Hausman v. Hausman,48 the Virginia Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the lien of a child support judgment docketed after 
the couple's divorce has priority over a recorded deed of trust exe-
cuted solely by the husband prior to the divorce, when the subject 
property was held by the husband and wife as tenants by the en-
tirety. The bank claimed that under the doctrine of after-acquired 
title,49 when the divorce decree was entered converting the title to 
43. 806 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1986). 
44. Id. at 1231-32. 
45. 233 Va. 130, 353 S.E.2d 777 (1987). 
46. Id. at 132-33, 353 S.E.2d at 779. 
47. Id. at 134, 353 S.E.2d at 780. 
48. 233 Va. 1, 353 S.E.2d 710 (1987). 
49. The doctrine of after-acquired title, also known as the equitable doctrine of estoppel 
by deed, codified at VA. CooE ANN. § 55-52 (Repl. Vol. 1986), reads: 
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tenancy in common, its lien became effective. The divorce decree 
was entered before the child support judgment was docketed.150 In 
rejecting the bank's argument, the supreme court ruled that the 
argument was based upon an erroneous reading of Code section 55-
52.151 The proper reading, according to the court, does not prejudice 
the rights of third parties. Therefore, the deed of trust was void as 
to the wife and children, giving the child support judgment prior-
ity over the deed of trust.152 
At issue in Cavalier Service Corp. v. Wise153 was the priority be-
tween a lis pendens and a federal tax lien docketed after the time 
of filing of the lis pendens but before it was reduced to judgment. 
The court, following the rationale of United States v. Security 
Trust & Savings Bank,154 held that a lis pendens is an inchoate 
right that becomes a lien against the property upon its being re-
duced to judgment. The court expressly rejected the argument that 
the judgment lien relates back to the time of filing the lis pendens, 
and declared that the filing of the lis pendens simply gives notice 
of a potential lien but does not affect the creditors of the defend-
ant. Further, the court declared that as between creditors, under 
Code section 55-96,515 priority is established by the one who first 
records the judgment. 
J. Marital Property Upon Divorce 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia in Morris v. Morris156 held that 
the wife did not have to convey her interest in jointly owned prop-
erty upon the husband's payment of a monetary award pursuant to 
a property settlement in a divorce action. The trial court only had 
When a deed purports to convey property, real or personal, describing it with rea-
sonable certainty, which the grantor does not own at the time of the execution of the 
deed, but subsequently acquires, such deed shall, as between the parties thereto, 
have the same effect as if the title which the grantor subsequently acquires were 
vested in him at the time of the execution of such deed and thereby conveyed. Any 
such deed, which shall have been executed by the consort of the grantor, shall bar the 
contingent right of dower or curtesy of such consort of the grantor therein. 
Id. (emphasis added.) 
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-460 (Cum. Supp. 1987). A child support judgment does not be-
come a lien on real estate until the judgment is docketed. 
51. Id. § 55-52 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
52. Hausman, 233 Va. at 4, 353 S.E.2d at 711. 
53. 645 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1986). 
54. 340 U.S. 47 (1950). 
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
56. 3 Va. App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986). 
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authority to order partition of the property, as well as order pay-
ment of a monetary award. However, the trial court could not con-
dition one upon the other. 
K. Mechanics' Liens 
In addition to holding that due process requires that the benefi-
ciary of a deed of trust be a necessary party to enforce a 
mechanic's lien, the court in Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp.,57 
reaffirmed that a deed of trust recorded before land is improved 
constitutes a first lien on the land but is subordinate to a 
mechanic's lien on subsequent improvements. The result is that a 
"mechanic's lien is a first lien on the improvements and a 
subordinate lien on so much of the land as is necessary for the use 
and enjoyment of the improvements. "118 
L. Partition 
In Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh,59 the Virginia Supreme Court 
held that when one party seeking sale of the property in lieu of 
partition fails to prove that the land cannot be conveniently parti-
tioned in kind, it is error for the trial court to order the sale of the 
subject property. 
M. Real Estate Closings 
In Pickus v. Virginia State Bar,60 the Virginia Supreme Court 
affirmed an order of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board sus-
pending the license of a closing attorney who failed to satisfy ex-
isting liens on the subject property. Instead, the attorney delivered 
loan funds, which were to be secured by a :first deed of trust, to his 
client who promised to satisfy the prior liens but failed to do so. 
57. 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986). It is not expressly required that the trustee and 
beneficiary of a deed of trust be made parties. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986). In 
Monk v. Exposition Deepwater Pier Corp., 111 Va. 121, 68 S.E.2d 280 (1910), it was held 
that the beneficiary of a subsequent deed of trust is not a necessary party to a suit to en-
force a mechanic's lien. In Loyola Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n v. Herndon Lumber & Millwork, 
Inc., 218 Va. 803, 241 S.E.2d 752 (1978), it was held that a trustee under a deed of trust is 
not an "owner" within the meaning of VA. CODE ANN.§ 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1986). Therefore, 
failure to name the trustee in a memorandum for a mechanic's lien does not render the 
mechanic's lien defective. 
58. Walt Robbins, 232 Va. at 47, 348 S.E.2d at 226. 
59. 232 Va. 250, 349 S.E.2d 141 (1986). 
60. 232 Va. 5, 348 S.E.2d 202 (1986). 
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The court found the necessary scienter for misrepresentation be-
cause the attorney certified to the title insurance company that the 
prior liens had been satisfied. Further, the court found that the 
Code of Professional Responsibility protects third parties as well 
as clients when an attorney handles monies on behalf of clients or 
third parties. 61 
N. Recording 
The federal distrfot court in Village Savings Bank v. Willey (In 
re Willey )62 overruled the bankruptcy court which had declared 
that a deed of trust was null and void as to the land sales contract 
of the debtors as purchasers. The district court ruled that the 
debtors/purchasers were on constructive or record notice of a prior 
lien on the property. Even if the contract purchasers were not on 
notice, they would not be bona fide purchasers as to the remaining 
unpaid purchase price but would only be protected for amounts 
already paid. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding 
that the lender had waived the "due on sale" clause by previously 
transferring title to the subject property to the vendors of the land 
sales contract. 63 
0. Rule Against Perpetuities; Construction of Option Contract 
In Layne v. Henderson,64 the court considered whether an op-
tion agreement allowing the survivors to purchase the interests of 
their deceased \>rother violated the rule against perpetuities. The 
trial court ruled that the agreement did violate the rule. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court overruled the trial court, determining that 
proper construction of the words "survivor or survivors" in the op-
tion agreement ref erred to the brothers themselves, not their es-
tates, successors or assigns. Therefore, the option would have to be 
exercised, if at all, by a surviving brother - a life in being at the 
time the executory interest was created. 65 
61. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1986). 
62. 65 Bankr. 832 (E.D. Va. 1986). 
63. Id. at 840. 
64. 232 Va. 332, 351 S.E.2d 18 (1986). 
65. The "wait and see" statute, VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-13.3 (Repl. Vol. 1986), effective July 
1, 1982, significantly modified the harsh fule against perpetuities. It did not apply to this 
suit which was filed April 27, 1982. The enactment specified that the provisions of the sec-
tion did not apply to or affect pending litigation. 1982 Va. Acts 399; see also Layne, 232 Va. 
at 336 n.*, 351 S.E.2d at 21 n.* 
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P. Subdivisions; Vacation of Plat 
In Dotson v. Harman,66 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a 
suit filed by lot owners, not parties to a prior suit filed by a neigh-
boring lot owner against the same defendants, was not barred by 
res judicata. The trial court erred in upholding the res judicata 
defense based on the belief that the defendant, Board of Supervi-
sors, adequately represented the same interest as the present 
plaintiffs in the closure of a road by vacation of a subdivision plat. 
The vacation of the plat was based on fraudulent statements made 
by the developer that no lots had been sold. 67 
Q. Zoning 
In National Memorial Park, Inc. v. Board of Zoning,68 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reaffirmed a long-standing and frequently 
cited rule that the decision to grant or deny a special use permit is 
a legislative, not an administrative, function. The decision carries 
with it a presumption of validity. Zoning board actions are only 
disturbed upon a showing that the action is arbitrary, capricious 
and a clear abuse of the board's discretion. 
In Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals,69 the Virginia Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the pro-
posed new conforming construction to a lawfully non-conforming 
use under the zoning acts does not increase the non-conformity so 
as to make the new construction prohibited. The trial court erred 
however, in placing the burden of proof upon the plaintiffs to show 
that the use was not a lawful non-conforming use. Challengers 
need only show the use is not permitted in the zoning district. The 
burden then shifts to the landowner to show his use is a lawful 
non-conforming use.70 
In Board of Supervisors v. Booker,11 the Virginia Supreme Court 
upheld a zoning amendment which made the landowners' previ-
ously approved use as a junkyard illegal. 
66. 232 Va. 402, 350 S.E.2d 642 (1986). 
67. Id. at 404, 350 S.E.2d at 644. 
68. 232 Va. 89, 348 S.E.2d 248 (1986). 
69. 233 Va. 37, 353 S.E.2d 727 (1987). 
70. Id. at 47, 353 S.E.2d at 734. 
71. 232 Va. 478, 352 S.E.2d 319 (1987). 
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II. LEGISLATION 
A. Condominiums 
Section 55-79.79(c) is changed to provide for a five year statute 
of limitations for breach of warranty.72 
Section 55-79.94 is amended to require inclusion in the public 
offering statement the results of an inspection for presence of as-
bestos in a conversion condominium building. The requirement ap-
plies to construction substantially completed prior to July 1, 
1978.73 
B. Deeds and Conveyances 
A lien creditor must now record a satisfaction within ninety days 
after notice that payment has been made. The amendment to sec-
tion 55-66.3 also increases the forfeiture penalty for failure to com-
ply within the recording requirement.74 
Deeds wherein a grantor conveys to himself, or himself and an-
other person, are valid if made prior to July 1, 1986.711 
Section 55-49.1 adds to the Code a provision that adopted per-
sons and persons born out of wedlock are presumptively included 
in certain class gift generic terms in the interpretation of deeds 
while presumptively excluded from other generic terms.76 By en-
acting this provision, the General Assembly upset the holding in 
Hyman v. Glover.77 In that case, the Virginia Supreme Court held 
that the term "issue" did not encompass adopted children in the 
construction of wills. 78 
Attorneys' fees and costs may now be assessed against the holder 
of a satisfied mortgage or deed of trust if the holder has unjustifi-
ably failed to release the lien. 79 
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.79(c) (Supp. 1987). 
73. Id. § 55-79.94(a)(6). 
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.3(A)(l) (Supp. 1987). 
75. Id. § 55-9. 
76. Id. § 55-49.1. 
77. 232 Va. 140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986). 
78. Id.; see also Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 
u. RICH. L. REV. 855 (1987). 
79. Id. § 55-66.5(c). 
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C. Deeds and Recording 
Section 55-101 is amended to provide that if two instruments are 
recorded on the same day and in the same place, and are stamped 
with identical times, the instrument number shall determine prior-
ity, unless other Code sections provide otherwise.80 
D. Landlord and Tenant 
1. Rental Property 
Section 55-218.1 is amended to clarify and expand the definition 
of nonresident landlords who must maintain an agent and business 
office within the Commonwealth.81 
2. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 
Section 55-248.13 is amended to include in the landlord's duty to 
"maintain fit premises" the requirement that the landlord supply 
reasonable air conditioning unless air conditioning is within the ex-
clusive control of the tenant.82 
The 120-day notice provision of conversion or rehabilitation of 
apartments cannot be waived through a term of the lease.83 Section 
55-248.13 now provides that the landlord "keep all common areas 
in ... clean and structurally safe condition."84 Sections 55-248.21 
and 55-248.31 are amended to provide that either the landlord or 
tenant may terminate the rental agreement after 30 days notice if 
the other commits nonremediable breach or intentionally recom-
mits previously remedied breach. 85 
E. Mechanics' Liens 
The notice of sales to enforce mechanics' liens must be adver-
tised in a "public place. "86 
80. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-101 (Supp. 1987). 
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-218.1 (Supp. 1987). 
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13(a)(6) (Supp. 1987). 
83. Id. §§ 55-222, -248.9. 
84. Id. § 55-248.13. 
85. Id. §§ 55-248.21, -248.31. 
86. VA. CODE ANN.§ 43-34 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
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F. Mobile Home Lot Rental Act 
Section 55-248.45 is amended to provide that a mobile home-
owner may now be restricted in his choice of vendors from whom 
he purchases his mobile home. The restriction may apply if the 
purchase is made in connection with the initial leasing or renting 
of a newly constructed lot not previously leased to any other per-
son. Otherwise, a mobile homeowner may freely choose from whom 
he may purchase his mobile home.s7 
G. Wet Settlement Closings Act 
A settlement agent may not disburse any loan funds prior to rec-
ordation of any instrument.ss Section 6.1-2.10 is also amended to 
include in the definition of settlement agent "any individual, cor-
poration, partnership, or other entity conducting the settlement 
and disbursement of loan proceeds."s9 Also, drafts issued by state 
or federally chartered credit unions are now included in the list of 
acceptable "loan funds" sources which the settlement agent may 
disburse without waiting for the draft to clear the agent's trust 
account.90 
H. Zoning 
Several amendments now clarify and distinguish a "special ex-
ception" from a "variance."91 
Section 15.1-503.2 grants local governments the authority, 
through zoning ordinances, to extend historic districts to protect 
approaches to historic sites. 92 
Sections 15.1-15 and 15.1-19.2 authorizes local governments to 
adopt building regulations including off-street parking require-
ments, minimum set-backs and minimum lot sizes.93 
Vacation of a plat may now be accomplished by the following 
alternative methods: (1) by the owners with consent of the gov-
erning body; or (2) by ordinance of the governing body.94 
87. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 55-248.45(C) (Supp. 1987). 
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.13 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
89. Id. § 6.1-2.10. 
90. Id. 
91. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-430(p), -491(a), -495(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. §§ 15.1-15(1), -19.2. 
94. Id. § 15.1-481. 
